Harold had an agreement
Brick Layer wrote: ↑
Thu Feb 08, 2018 1:03 am
When Kelvin L. Harold challenged the doctrine and lost, The Seventh Circuit applied what is left of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
because Harold had an agreement
to the judgment’s entry nearly two decades ago, but failed to pay, which caused the judgment’s (alleged) creditor, Steel, to secure a garnishment order from the Indiana court. The only injury that Harold suffered occurred when the state judge ruled against him; [Harold’s claim did not include fraud
]. Harold v. Steel, No. 14-1875 (7th Cir. Dec. 11, 2014)
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U. S. C. §1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction [Plaintiff’s fraud claim], and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to this Court, see 28 U. S. C. §1257(a). The doctrine has no application to judicial review of executive action, including determinations made by a state administrative agency. [See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U. S. 635, 644, n. 3 (2002)
] (Rooker-Feldman does not apply to a suit seeking review of state agency action).
EXCEPTION TO ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
And yet, an exception to Rooker-Feldman of just such an equitable persuasion has taken root. A few courts—most especially the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
[In re Sun Valley Foods Co., 801 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1986)
] — have determined that Rooker Feldman does not prevent the lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments that were allegedly procured through fraud.
In other words, when a “state-court loser” complains that the winner owes his triumph not to sound legal principles—or even unsound ones—but to fraud, then the loser is not really complaining of an injury caused by a state-court judgment, but of an injury caused by the “winner’s chicanery
”. Or so the reasoning goes.
This reasoning received an intellectual boost from Exxon Mobil, where the scope of what kinds of actions were “inextricably intertwined” with state-court judgments took a serious blow [Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291
]. In Exxon Mobil, the Court clarified that not all actions dealing with the “same or related question” resolved in state court are barred in federal court [Id. at 292.]. Instead, a district court must retain a case that presents an “independent claim” even if, along the way, the claimant challenges or denies some conclusion reached by the state court
[Id. at 293 (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)
The Plaintiff [Appellant] is not reviewing ‘child support’ wherefore has never brought up the issue of ‘arrears’ had that been Plaintiff’s issue the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine may have applied; Plaintiff [Appellant] is not arguing ‘Child Support’ instead [Appellees] ‘Agency Actions’ a Judicial Review of the administrative agencies fraud(s).
"Although not really cognized as such, family court orders are a acourt of equity's creation of private law.
A legally enforceable and binding agreement 45 CFR § 302.50 (a)(2).
SSA Title IV § 303.1-Safeguards
303.101 (c)(3)(4) safeguards.
“The due process rights of the parties involved must be protected”
“The parties must be provided a copy of the voluntary support order”.
"For a Friend of the court case" Michigan's parties 'payer’s' agreement, that is reviewed by the court and entered into the record [docket], MCL 552.604 Sec. 4(3)(b); MCL 552.604 Sec. 4(3)(a)(iii).
In California, commissioners need the WRITTEN stipulation of the parties litigant in the record before their orders can be valid. Family Code sec. 4251; in re Marriage of Monge; CRC 2.831
The Nevada Supreme Court in Morelli v. Morelli 102 Nev. 326, 720 P.2d 704 (1986) reasoned that the child is an intended third-party beneficiary of an agreement for support between the parents.
“A stipulation is a statement of agreement or admission of factual information, an agreement made by parties or by their attorneys in a judicial proceeding before the court. Stipulations are entered into the record to assist the court in establishing facts “not in dispute.” Stipulations are only binding between the parties that made the agreement, not on third parties.”
A signed divorce decree is a form of a stipulation.
'A consent judgment of divorce is a contract and interpreted using contract principles. If a consent judgment is ambiguous, a clarification is only permitted when no change in the rights of the parties will result from the clarification. Michigan case cite, Roller v Roller, unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 26, 2012 (Docket No. 300543).'
Hague Child Support Convention: Judicial Guide • Chapter Two • Page Eleven • Footnote 20
“It is important to note that such an agreement between the parties
in the U.S. would be treated as a contract
, but, if the foreign agreement was enforceable only as a contract in the issuing country, it would not fall within the scope of the Convention.”
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/f ... _guide.pdf
The [REGISTERED CHILD SUPPORT CASE] agreement is required between the parties enforceable as a contract within the scope of the convention (enforceable outside the issuing country) within all reciprocating countries, but/AND still requires the bilateral agreement.
https://www.suijurisforum.com/posting.p ... 10&p=74224
IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE:
Though not a child support matter illustrates how an agreement [MCL 552.604 (child support) payer's agreement] would be [misconstrued] viewed as a state court matter when in fact IT IS NOT! Instead of a judicial de jure state court [for the state of Michigan as each claim under the one court of justice]; instead of a state court judge, 'they're' under contract to act as judge surrogate for a foreign tribunal of the Hague, [Hague Convention] a foreign principle.